An in-depth analysis into the operations of the shadow payment gateway acquiring.s-payments reveals a complex scheme designed to launder money and facilitate illegal fund transfers under the guise of legitimate financial services.
At first glance, acquiring.s-payments presents itself as a modern fintech platform offering digital acquiring and seamless international payments. However, behind the sleek interface lies a web of financial manipulation involving proxy directors, shell companies, and coordinated “salary projects” within banks across the CIS and Southeast Asia.
Key Mechanism of Operation
The platform does not act as a traditional acquiring solution. Instead, it operates as a front—set up through networks of anonymous or stolen identities acting as nominal directors. These individuals open bank accounts under false pretenses, which are then used to channel funds from clients involved in illicit activities, including gambling, crypto arbitrage, and grey-market online services.
These accounts mimic legitimate payroll services, often with transaction memos referencing salary payments, freelance invoices, or vendor settlements. However, these are rarely tied to actual employment or service contracts. Funds are rapidly withdrawn in cash or sent to third-party wallets and Asian banks, where tracing becomes significantly more difficult.
Link to Cash-Out Schemes and Asia
Although acquiring.s-payments has no confirmed direct operations in Pakistan, investigators have noted an architectural similarity between its model and other known schemes actively targeting the Pakistani financial network. This includes funneling money into the region using disguised remittance channels—frequently bypassing currency controls and AML regulations.
Similar patterns have been observed in operations involving Bangladesh and Myanmar, where payments originating from “salary” gateways eventually show up in digital wallets linked to gambling hubs, e-commerce fronts, and fake consultancy firms.
Why It Matters
What makes this scheme particularly dangerous is its ability to blend in with genuine fintech projects. By positioning itself as a payment aggregator, the gateway avoids direct involvement in gambling or fraud—making it harder for regulators to classify it as illegal at first glance.
The use of offshore structures, combined with jurisdictions lacking strict KYC requirements, creates an ecosystem where dirty money is cleaned through repeated transfers, disbursements, and reintegration into the formal economy. Governments lose tax revenue, and authorities face increasing difficulty in distinguishing legal flows from illicit ones.
Call to Action
Financial watchdogs, particularly in regions such as the UAE, Hong Kong, and Singapore—often used as endpoints in these schemes—must enhance their scrutiny of incoming payments labeled as salaries or freelance transactions from unknown offshore processors.
Meanwhile, digital banks and neobanks in CIS countries should re-evaluate the legitimacy of corporate clients whose only activity involves high-volume payroll operations with no employee records or taxable operations.
Unless proactive steps are taken, platforms like acquiring.s-payments will continue to serve as invisible pipelines, draining funds out of national economies under the radar of even advanced compliance systems.